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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The BOC Group, Inc., leased a cryogenic screw auger to 
Quality Foods Company under an agreement that Quality 
Foods would provide a safe work place and protect its 
employees against injury. Helen Kane, a Quality Foods 
employee, was cleaning condensation from the ceiling in the 
area of the screw auger when her right arm became 
entangled in it. Her arm was trapped for nearly two hours 
and was amputated as a result of the injury to it. The issue 
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facing us in this appeal is whether the language of the lease 
agreement was sufficient to make Quality Foods liable to 
BOC for Quality Foods' breach of its contractual obligation 
to provide a safe work place. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction of this case under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332, and we have jurisdiction to review the 
judgment of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we will vacate thefinal 
judgment and remand this case to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
On January 4, 1995, Helen Kane, a control technician for 
Quality Foods Company, suffered the injury, which 
necessitated the amputation of her arm. At the time of the 
accident, Kane was working near the screw auger while its 
lid was open. The proximity switch, which prevents the 
machine from operating with the lid open, had been 
bypassed and the rotating screw auger was exposed. The 
machine was manufactured by Airco Industrial Gases, a 
division of BOC, and was leased to Quality Foods on July 
8, 1991, under an "Application Equipment Rental 
Agreement." One of the provisions of the Agreement 
imposed on Quality Foods the duty to safeguard its 
workplace for its employees. 
 
Kane received benefits for her injuries under the New 
Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
SS 34:15-1 et seq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). She then 
brought an action against BOC for negligence, product 
liability, and breach of warranty. BOC in turn filed a third- 
party complaint against Quality Foods, alleging 
indemnification and breach of contract to provide a safe 
workplace. 
 
Before trial, BOC settled with Kane for two million 
dollars. Quality Foods then moved for summary judgment 
and BOC moved for partial judgment. After oral argument, 
the District Court granted Quality Foods' motion for 
summary judgment against BOC on January 22, 1998. 
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Kane v. BOC Group, Inc., No. 95-3147 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 
1998). The District Court held that the language of the 
Agreement was insufficient as a matter of law to provide 
BOC with a right of indemnification from Quality Foods. 
The District Court did not, however, address BOC's breach 
of contract claim. 
 
Upon appeal by BOC, we affirmed the District Court's 
decision regarding the express indemnification claim but 
vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded the 
case for further consideration of BOC's breach of contract 
claim. Kane v. BOC Group, Inc., No. 98-1152, slip op. at 7- 
8 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 1998). We also directed the District 
Court to examine Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. v. Honeywell 
Protective Servs., 535 A.2d 974, 976 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987), in relation to BOC's breach of contract claim. 
 
On remand, the District Court again granted Quality 
Foods' motion for summary judgment on BOC's third-party 
complaint by a November 30, 1999, Memorandum and 
Order. Kane v. BOC Group, Inc., No. 95-3147 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
30, 1999). Relying on New Jersey precedent, most notably 
Honeywell and Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 186 A.2d 
274 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1962), the District Court explained that 
BOC's breach of contract claim could not withstand 
summary judgment because "BOC can present no set of 
facts that would establish that BOC could have been liable 
to Kane for a claim that it could then recover from Quality 
[Foods]." Id. at 11. 
 
BOC now appeals to this court. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). Because 
subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship, "we must apply the substantive law as decided 
by the state's highest court." Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 343, 348 (3d Cir. 1997). Where there is 
no controlling decision from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, we accord "significant weight" to applicable decisions 
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of the lower courts of New Jersey in order to "forecast how 
the Supreme Court would resolve the issue." Id. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
The New Jersey cases of Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. v. 
Honeywell Protective Servs., 535 A.2d 974 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1987), and Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 186 
A.2d 274 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1962), provide the standard under 
which a third-party can recover against an employer based 
upon the employer's breach of contract to provide a safe 
workplace and to protect employees against injury. In 
Honeywell, the Port Authority had contracted with 
Honeywell to service its warehouse alarm system. Under 
the contract, Honeywell was required to "exercise every 
precaution to prevent injuries to persons and to design and 
erect such barricades, ladders, scaffolding, fences and 
railings . . . as may be necessary, desirable or proper." 535 
A.2d at 976-77. A Honeywell employee was injured while 
servicing the alarm system in a warehouse owned by the 
Port Authority. The employee sued the Port Authority 
alleging negligence in maintaining the building, and the 
Port Authority, in turn, sued Honeywell for express 
indemnification, implied indemnification, and breach of its 
contractual obligation to protect the safety of its employees 
in the performance of its work. 
 
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, found 
that based on the language of the contract "there is a 
potential contractual basis for a jury to find liability on the 
part of Honeywell." Id. at 979. Putting to the side the 
express and implied indemnification theories of recovery,1 
the court recognized breach of contract as a viable claim 
that was not barred by the Worker's Compensation Act: 
 
       We are convinced that a rule allowing a third party to 
       recover damages from an employer based upon the 
       employer's breach of its agreement to safeguard its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The court found that the Port Authority could not maintain its claim 
against Honeywell based on an express indemnification theory. The Port 
Authority's claim based on an implied indemnification theory was 
remanded. 
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       employees from harm during the performance of the 
       contract does no violence to the policy and purpose of 
       the Workers' Compensation Act. The object of the 
       exclusive-remedy provision is in no sense subverted by 
       such an action. 
 
Id. at 981. 
 
As the Honeywell court explained, its holding was 
informed by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in 
Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center. There, Mayer, an invitee 
of the Fairlawn Jewish Center, brought an action for 
negligence against the Center for injuries he suffered while 
on its premises. Randall Construction was joined as 
defendant because it was making repairs and alterations to 
the Center's buildings at the time of Mayer's injury. The 
Center filed a cross-claim against Randall seeking damages 
for breach of contract. The contract between the Center and 
Randall had provided: "The Contractor shall adequately 
protect the work, adjacent property and the public, and 
shall be responsible for any damage or injury due to his act 
or neglect." 186 A.2d at 278. The trial court severed the 
Center's cross-claim, and Mayer's action against the Center 
and Randall proceeded to trial, resulting in the jury finding 
that Mayer's accident was caused by the combined 
negligence of the Center and Randall. The trial court 
subsequently dismissed the cross-claim. 
 
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
whether the Center could maintain a breach of contract 
claim depended on the nature of its liability. According to 
the court, the jury's finding that Mayer's injuries were 
caused by the joint negligence of the Center and Randall 
could mean liability was imposed on the Center for one of 
the following reasons: 
 
       1) because of Randall's violation of Center's 
       nondelegable duty to Mayer, or 2) [it] arose from a 
       conclusion that after actual or constructive notice of 
       the unguarded areaway created by Randall, Center was 
       guilty of Secondary negligence with respect thereto, 
       that is, it failed to supply some physical protection or 
       warning in order to avoid injury to its invitees, or 3) [it] 
       resulted from a finding that Center was guilty of 
 
                                6 
  
       independent Active negligence which concurred with 
       that of Randall in producing the accident. 
 
Id. at 282. According to the court, if the Center's liability 
was based on secondary or passive negligence as illustrated 
by the first two alternatives, then the Center would be 
allowed to recover from Randall. If, however, the Center's 
liability derived from independent active negligence of the 
type illustrated in the third alternative, there could be no 
recovery based on breach of contract. Id. 
 
As the District Court noted, Honeywell and Mayer stand 
for the proposition that "a contractee cannot recover any 
damages against a contractor if the injuries sustained by 
the employee were in part caused by the contractee's active 
negligence." Kane v. BOC Group, Inc., No. 95-3147, slip op. 
at 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1999). Applying this standard, the 
District Court ruled that BOC could recover its settlement 
costs from Quality Foods for breach of contract only if 
BOC's fault could be characterized as passive or if BOC 
faced no liability to Kane. The District Court rejected the 
first possibility that BOC's liability was based on passive 
negligence because it found that the nature of Kane's 
claims dictated a finding of active fault. Id.  at 13. The 
second possibility, the District Court concluded, would not 
help BOC because "[w]ithout facing any liability to the 
original plaintiff, BOC settled a meritless claim, and 
therefore would be precluded from recovering any of the 
improper settlement from Quality [Foods]." Id. at 15. We 
disagree with both conclusions drawn by the District Court. 
 
The District Court, as well as the parties, made much of 
the active/passive negligence or fault distinction used in 
Honeywell and Mayer. But concepts such as these, which 
are "constructed and labelled in order to accomplish what 
is commonly agreed to be a just and equitable result, tend 
nevertheless, like all legal fictions, to become increasingly 
technical, continuously qualified, and ultimately more 
formally categorical than substantively meaningful." 
Doloughty v. Blanchard Construction Co., 352 A.2d 613, 619 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). The concept of failure to 
warn, for example, can take on the label of passive or active 
negligence depending on the context. In Honeywell and 
Mayer, failure to warn of danger created by another is a 
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breach of duty that constitutes, when compared with the 
culpability of the party that created the danger in the first 
place, passive fault. In a product liability setting, failure to 
warn is a breach of duty for which a manufacturer would 
be held liable based on its "active" negligence in 
manufacturing a product that lacks adequate warning. See 
e.g., Priolo v. Compacker, Inc., 728 A.2d 239, 247 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 
378 A.2d 53, 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). 
 
The lesson of Honeywell and Mayer, therefore, is not that 
the result depends on the mere use of the terms"active" or 
"passive" negligence or fault, but that we must look to the 
reasoning that gives meaning to these words. Simply stated, 
Honeywell and Mayer teach us to look to the contract and 
determine whether the negligence, if any, of one party to 
the contract [BOC] is the sort of act that the agreement 
with the other party to the contract [Quality Foods] was 
meant to cover. If BOC's negligence is the kind of conduct 
beyond the scope of the undertaking contractually assumed 
by the Quality Foods, then BOC cannot recover: 
 
       The theme of the contract [to provide a safe working 
       place] is that the contractor [here Quality Foods] will 
       not perform . . . work in such negligent fashion as to 
       create dangerous conditions on the premises and 
       thereby expose third persons to harm. Protection of 
       such persons against independent negligent acts of 
       commission of the contractee [here BOC] must be 
       considered beyond the scope of that undertaking in the 
       absence of language establishing such a broad 
       obligation. 
 
Mayer, 186 A.2d at 281-82 (citations omitted). 
 
BOC cannot, however, be held to ensure that Quality 
Foods fulfills the obligations that the agreement by its very 
terms assigns to Quality Foods. Thus, if BOC's negligence 
consists merely of failing to discover and correct Quality 
Food's own breach of contract to provide a safe working 
place, BOC's negligence does not excuse Quality Foods' 
breach and BOC may recover. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. 
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 135 (1956) ("the 
contractor, as the warrantor of its own services, cannot use 
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the [contractee's] failure to discover and correct the 
contractor's own breach of warranty as a defense."). 
 
Here, the Agreement between BOC and Quality Foods 
imposed upon Quality Foods certain continuing duties to 
safeguard the workplace for its employees, such as 
operating the equipment in accordance with all applicable 
laws and regulations, providing safe operating conditions, 
and not altering the equipment in any way.2 If Kane's 
injuries resulted from BOC's defective design or 
manufacture of the conveyer, then BOC cannot recover on 
a breach of contract theory from Quality Foods because 
Quality Foods' obligation under the Agreement was limited 
to providing a safe workplace for the use of the conveyor 
and did not extend to assuring the safety of the conveyor as 
designed and manufactured by BOC. If BOC employees 
were the ones who in fact encouraged Quality Food 
personnel to bypass the proximity switch in order to 
operate the machine with the lid open, it would be BOC, 
not Quality Foods, that had created the unsafe work place. 
If, however, Kane's injuries resulted from Quality Foods' 
own failure to provide a safe workplace--e.g., Quality Foods 
altered the equipment, discarded warnings originally posted 
by BOC, or did not instruct employees on the proper use of 
the equipment--then under Honeywell and Mayer, Quality 
Foods' actions or inactions would constitute a breach of 
contract that can form a basis for BOC to recover from 
Quality Foods. 
 
We also reject the District Court's conclusion that BOC 
cannot maintain a breach of contract action if Quality 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The pertinent part of the Agreement read: 
 
The Equipment shall be operated by User in strict conformity with all 
applicable laws, ordinances, orders or regulations of all public 
authorities, and the instructions furnished by [BOC]. The User shall 
notify its employees, agents and subcontractors involved with the use, 
operation and/or maintenance of the Equipment of[BOC]'s instructions 
and the User shall be responsible for assuring that appropriate safety 
procedures are followed by such individuals at all times. . . . User shall 
keep the Equipment clean and in safe operating conditions at all times. 
. . . The Equipment shall not be altered or changed by the User in any 
way. . . . Agreement, P 3. 
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Foods were wholly at fault and BOC did not face any 
liability to Kane. The District Court explained:"If Quality's 
conduct were the cause of Kane's injuries and BOC did not 
cause the harm, then BOC would not face any liability to 
Kane at all. Without facing any liability to the original 
plaintiff, BOC settled a meritless claim, and therefore, 
would be precluded from recovering any of the improper 
settlement from Quality." Kane, slip op. at 15. In reaching 
this conclusion, the District Court relied on the standard 
set out in Frank Martz Coach Co., Inc. v. Hudson Bus 
Transp. Co. Inc., 44 A.2d 488, 481 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945) 
(citing Popkin Bros., Inc. v. Volk's Tire Co. , 23 A.2d 162 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1941), which provides that in order for an 
indemnitee to recover from the indemnitor, he must show, 
among other things, that the settlement was reasonable. 
But this standard applies to recovery based on the theory 
of indemnification, not breach of contract as BOC is here 
asserting. 
 
Both the Honeywell and Mayer decisions emphasized 
that the breach of contract theory is a cause of action 
separate from the theories of express or implied 
indemnification. Thus in Honeywell, the court wrote about 
the breach of contract theory: "Even without regard to the 
theory of implied indemnification, there is a potential 
contractual basis for a jury to find liability on the part of 
Honeywell . . .." 535 A.2d at 980. And the court in Mayer 
observed about the Center's breach of contract claim: "We 
are not dealing here with a claim of express or implied 
indemnity or restitution." 186 A.2d at 561. Even Martz, 
from which the District Court cites the standard for 
indemnification, recognized that recovery based on breach 
of contract is different from recovery based on 
indemnification. In Martz, the plaintiff 's complaint for 
recovery of settlement money consisted of two counts--the 
first was based on breach of contract and the second was 
based on indemnity. Instead of treating the two counts 
identically, as the District Court would have us do, the 
court found against the plaintiff on the breach of contract 
count because he had failed to prove a breach, not because 
he had not met the indemnification standard that the court 
applied to the second count. Id. at 489. 
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The fact that BOC can recover on the breach of contract 
theory what it is unable to recover on the theories of 
express and implied indemnity does not change the 
analysis. In Polidori v. Kordys, Puzio & Di Tomasso, AIA, 
526 A.2d 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), the court 
faced the same objection. Its response is apt here: 
 
       [T]he damages here are claimed to flow as a 
       consequence of a breach of the contractual relationship 
       between Polidori, Kordys, and Superior. This is an 
       entirely separate and distinct cause of action from the 
       contribution and indemnification counts of the 
       complaint. What Kordys and Superior are arguing, in 
       effect, is that because Polidori is precluded from 
       recovery on one theory, he must be barred from 
       recovery on all others. This is obviously incorrect. It is 
       simply of no consequence that an award on the 
       contract count of the complaint would have the effect 
       of giving Polidori the recovery he could not obtain on 
       the contribution and indemnification counts. This is a 
       common result where a complaint alleges more than 
       one theory of recovery. 
 
Id. at 235. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court erred in 
concluding that BOC's breach of contract claim was 
insufficient as a matter of law. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the final 
judgment of November 30, 1999, and remand this case to 
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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